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ABSTRACT 
 
Recognising that governance is the key to South Africa's future as a global player in the 
property market, this study explores the protection of shareholders' interests in listed 
property funds in South Africa. The views of property managers, asset managers and 
analysts involved in the listed property sector were obtained through in-depth, semi-
structured interviews. The main themes highlighted in the data are transparency and 
disclosure which are a major factor in corporate governance being successful. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH 
 
1.1 THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
After decades of apartheid and discrimination on the basis of race, democratic elections 
were held in South Africa for the first time in April 1994. While the start of democracy 
was a time of uncertainty (Bush, 2005: pg 58-62), by the start of 1998, the mood in the 
South African economy had improved to one of cautious optimism – interest rates had 
begun to fall in October of the previous year, another drop in lending rates was 
anticipated within the first quarter and all seemed set to accelerate the GDP growth, 
which had been slowing throughout 1997. The interest rate was cut in March, and further 
cuts were anticipated. Inflation dropped to a new 25-year low, with consumer price index 
inflation at 5% (Bush, 2005: pg 58-62).  
 
This economic development was translated and reflected in the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE), which showed some important strides in technology, security and 
auditing during this period (Bush, 2005: pg 58-62). The listed securities grew 
dramatically, with most of the growth taking place in the listed property portfolios.  
 
Five years ago, the JSE property sector was very different (Bush, 2005: pg 58-62). It was 
largely seen as the domain of stodgy, unadventurous investors determined to chase yields 
rather than follow the excitement of ‘sexy’ equities. Since early 2004, the sector index 
has risen by 50%, and the market capitalisation has soared by 80% to R74 billion. This 
exceptional growth warrants a critical evaluation of the listed property portfolio and the 
mechanisms that govern it (Bush, 2005: pg 58-62).  
 
1.2 THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
As there are potential conflicts between fund managers, shareholders and managers 
pursuing activities that enhance their interests rather than those of the shareholders,  this 
research  seeks to determine  whether  the governance mechanisms of the listed property 
funds in South Africa are sufficient to ensure that the shareholders are adequately 
protected. A relevant question is how shareholders can protect their interest and ensure 
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that their managers do not siphon funds or make poor investments that are to the 
shareholder's detriment.  
 
1.3 THE PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
The problem definition is to determine the potential conflict of interest in listed property 
funds and to determine if the governance mechanism is sufficient to protect shareholders' 
interests.  
 
The sub-problems: 
 
•  To research the listed property funds governance mechanisms to determine if they 
protect the shareholders' interests. 
•  To research the potential conflicts of interests between the various stakeholders 
who manage the funds on behalf of the shareholders. 
 
1.4 THE DELIMITATIONS 
 
This research addresses the facets of the listed property industry of both the Property Unit 
Trusts (PUT) and the Property Loan Stocks (PLS).  
 
PUTs are listed under the Real Estate sector of the JSE Limited, together with PLSs. 
Comprising a portfolio of investment grade properties, each PUT generates value for the 
investor through a combination of a share in the rental income (yields) of the property 
portfolio and through the appreciation over time of the underlying property assets. Not 
only are PUTs managed by experienced and reputable management companies which are 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the properties, including lease management, 
and for the investment strategy of the trust, but they are also subject to stringent 
regulatory requirements. They are governed by the Collective Investment Schemes 
Control Act, under the auspices of the Registrar of Collective Investment Schemes, a 
function of the Financial Services Board (FSB). In addition, the affairs of the 
management companies which administer the PUTs are regulated by a Trust Deed drawn 
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up between the management company and a trustee. PUTs are also subject to all the 
regulatory requirements imposed by the JSE for a securities exchange listing (Barnard, 
Jacobs and Mellet, 2006: pg 1-25). 
 
OWNERSHIP MANAGEMENT REGULATION 
Unit holders have effective 
direct ownership of the 
fund and its underlying 
property assets. 
Professional asset and 
property managers manage 
the fund and the underlying 
properties. 
- Registrar of 
Collective 
Investment 
Schemes 
- JSE Limited 
- Financial 
Services 
Board 
- Auditors 
- Trustees 
PROPERTY UNIT TRUST 
Underlying properties 
 
 
Property Loan Stock (PLSs) companies invest solely in property. As with all other listed 
companies, they are subjected to the Companies Act and JSE regulations and are 
governed by the memoranda, articles of association and debenture trust deeds.  
 
The main difference between PLS companies and others is how their owners fund the 
investment. The owner of a PLS company needs to buy a linked unit which consists of a 
share and a debenture (loan). The debenture portion earns interest, which comes from the 
net income (income less expenses) that the PLS company decides on from the properties 
in which the company invests. A PLS company's income is taxed in the hands of the 
investors (Barnard, Jacobs and Mellet, 2006: pg 1-25).  
 
The delimitations of the research are to investigate the potential conflict of interest and 
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governance mechanisms in the total JSE listed property portfolio funds. As the value of 
the listed funds on the JSE has increased dramatically over the past few years, the 
corporate governance and ‘agency theory’ is researched. 
 
1.5 CONCLUSION  
 
With the South African economy slowly maturing, corporate governance is becoming a 
critical part of business practice. This is equally true for the property sector which is 
known for its lack of transparency. Today's investor is also more educated, which  
impacts on the choice of investment vehicles and what is expected of them.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter outlines the literature that was covered to derive the propositions against 
which the research was conducted. It starts with an introduction into property and asset 
management, managerial opportunism and property securitisation. It then covers the 
definition of corporate governance, the mechanisms and agency theory. It concludes with 
a summary of the argument thus far. The review forms a solid foundation for an 
investigation into the potential conflicts of interests between key players involved in 
listed property funds and to investigate the governance mechanisms to protect 
shareholders interests. 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The future of the asset management industry remains secure (Adendorff and Nkadu, 
1996). Many fund managers feel fairly confident about  their future in the industry and 
about the  opportunities for new entrants and niche players to enter the market. The main 
drivers that influence the future of fund management include the rapidly changing 
demographic profile across most developed countries, the trend towards privatisation of 
social welfare provision and the emergence of intergenerational transfer of wealth 
(Adendorff and Nkadu, 1996: pg 134-148). The combination of these factors will have a 
profound effect on the way we do business. As increasing numbers of people accumulate 
wealth, live longer and have a higher expectation of living standards, investment 
managers face the challenge of providing accessible, uncomplicated and relevant 
products for their expanding number of customers. In emerging countries such as South 
Africa, there is even a move towards creating state pension fund schemes (Morrell, 1994: 
pg 8-21). 
 
Much of what is deemed the “new economy” is in fact consumers and businesses having 
greater convenience, choice and efficiency in fulfilling their needs, rather than a 
fundamental change in these needs. It is generally a process of ongoing development 
rather than a radical change (Morrell, 1994: pg 8-21). However, despite these rapid 
changes, the essence of the fund management industry is not expected to change greatly. 
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Institutional asset management will continue to rely on good relations between managers 
and trustees, engendered by good performance, accurate assessment of clients’ needs and 
timely reporting of performance. In retail fund management, branding remains of 
paramount importance for the fund manager, as investors have an ever-widening array of 
funds and providers to choose from (Morrell, 1994: pg 8-21). 
 
While there is an increasing demand for transparency, it is virtually impossible for lay 
investors to detect weaknesses in a company's financial statistics.  Investors effectively 
lend their life savings with the hope of securing a certain level of return, but they are 
never made fully aware of the high level of risk inherent in their decision (Morrell, 1994: 
pg 8-21). 
 
One of the main drivers in determining the future of asset management is the role of 
government. The introduction of the Pension Fund Act 1995, for example, had a 
significant impact on the industry (Morrell, 1994: pg 8-21). Changes such as pension 
funds trustees appointing specialist asset managers rather than balanced managers, the 
creation of customised benchmarks and a shift away from peer-group benchmarks altered 
the sector significantly (Morrell, 1994: pg 8-21). Therefore, when considering the future 
of fund management, one should bear in mind the influence of legislation and regulation 
(Morrell, 1994: pg 8-21). 
 
Most investments in direct property in South Africa continue to be held by Life Offices 
and Pension Funds, despite reduced investments in this sector in recent years (Hunting, 
1999: pg 60-65). These investments are illiquid assets that are expensive to manage and 
cannot always be realized in times of need of liquidity risk (Hunting, 1999: pg 60-65).  
 
There has been a trend in the past decade for local institutions to outsource their property 
management function. This has resulted in established, independent property 
consultancies being contracted as service providers to assume the role of landlord’s 
intermediary. However, this trend has moved in cycles, with a shift back to internal 
management from time to time. It appears that when the market is active, the business is 
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outsourced, but when it is slower, owners try to derive income from self management.  
 
 A property manager's primary objective is to safeguard the interest of the property 
investor and to ensure that the return on the investment is maximised at all times. This 
must be achieved without compromising the quality of the investment or its potential for 
future income and capital growth, which means ensuring expected cash flows are met. 
This suggests that separating the roles of the property manager and the asset manager is 
well-founded (Hunting, 1999: pg 60-65).  
 
The asset manager benefits from the increased use of the professional skills and expertise 
of established property consultants that have property management and broking divisions, 
such as the following: 
 
•  The provision of market intelligence, and hence strategic investment data, gleaned 
from specialist activities in relation to decisions on disposals, acquisitions and 
lease terms. 
•  The preparation of independent market-related property valuations. 
•  Timeous research and investigation of individual property investments to either 
exploit the potential for latent value or recommend early warning strategies in 
problem cases. 
•  The role of the asset manager is to assist the owner in decisions regarding the 
acquisition and disposal of assets. 
 
2.2 SECURITISATION OF PROPERTY INDUSTRY 
 
Generally, investors limit service providers to day-to-day property management. Strategic 
investment decisions that affect portfolio performance are generally excluded from the 
contractual mandate (Goobey, 1990: pg 28-35). Thus, a firm line is drawn between the 
property manager and the property asset manager, with the investors dictating and 
controlling decisions concerning the performance of directly-held individual properties 
and portfolios as a whole (Goobey, 1990: pg 28-35).  
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It follows that the independent property consultancies that provide a property 
management service have not been able to make meaningful inroads into property asset 
management (Goobey, 1990: pg 28-35). The notable exceptions are those consultancies 
that are contracted to management companies of listed or other formal property 
investment vehicles. However, there does appear to be a shift in mood towards property 
as an investment and as there is a possible lack of expertise in this field, employing such 
expertise in-house would be costly (Goobey, 1990: pg 28-35).  
 
Major investors are now focusing their attention on trading stock and the potential 
benefits of securitisation, which presents the opportunity for holders of direct property to 
dilute investments and increase liquidity (Newell and Fife, 1995: pg 8-19). Securitisation 
is the conversion of directly held property into tradable securities which are more easily 
transferred between investors, such as property trusts. The trusts are thus the actual 
investors, such as trusts of trusts. The tradability issue is critical and accordingly the 
securities tend to be listed on a recognised stock exchange. Internationally, securitisation 
has taken off and property investment trusts in South Africa, have followed suit (Newell 
and Fife, 1995: pg 8-19). Securitisation has become the accepted practice whereby the 
major local institutions have restructured their property assets. The traditional models of 
capital structure are based on the premise that corporate managers always act in the best 
interest of the owners and that the primary aim of managers is to increase shareholders 
wealth. However, some researches have argued that managers do not always do so 
(Newell and Fife, 1995 pg 8-19). Instead, they pursue actions that serve to perpetuate 
their own agenda, which may be in conflict with the owners’ interests. Managers are also 
prone to spending available funds in “empire-building” projects that enhance their own 
power and public reputation (Newell and Fife, 1995: pg 8-19).  
 
Newell and Fife (1995) argue that illiquidity, indivisibility and lack of flexibility are the 
traditional criticisms of direct property investment, compared to equities and gilts. In 
recent years, this has been accentuated in most property markets with a decreased 
demand for property investment and an increase in the completion value of property 
projects.  
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In recent years, these concerns have been the catalyst for the development of a range of 
property investment vehicles in many countries (Newell and Fife, 1995: pg 8-19). 
Property securitisation or the ability to divide a single property asset effectively into 
smaller, more readily tradable interests has been the focus of these liquid developments. 
Property securitisation is expected to offer a number of attractive property investments 
benefits, including: 
 
•  Improved tradability and liquidity. 
•  Ability to invest in high assets of a value that would otherwise be beyond normal 
prudent investment criteria. 
•  Ability for investors to achieve better investment mix by diversifying risk in terms 
of geographic spread and property type. 
•  Greater investment flexibility, with ability to react more quickly to changes in 
market conditions. 
•  Partial disposal of an asset while retaining significant management benefits. 
•  Ability for investment managers to reduce costs through economies of scale and 
specialization. 
•  Enabling investors to develop strategic links with other institutional property 
investors. 
•  Enabling institutions to re-weight property sector exposure, while retaining 
management control. 
•  Prestige of investing in “trophy” property assets. 
•  Possible reduction in differentiation between fund managers on basis of quantum 
funds. 
•  Redirection of investment performance. 
 
Potential disadvantages of property securitisation include thin trading markets, price 
volatility and lack of directional control over management of the property asset (Newell 
and Fife, 1995: pg 8-19). While the specific applicable property securitisation investment 
vehicle is clearly dependent on the different prevailing legal structures, tax regimes and 
economic circumstances, the emergence of improved exit options has seen property 
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securitisation receive considerable attention in the financial sector as a viable option for 
both large and small investors. The expectation is for growth in the range of new and 
innovative financial instruments relating to property.  
 
The factors that are likely to cause an increase in the use of securitised property vehicles 
in the next few years include: 
 
•  Fund managers showing greater caution towards direct property. 
•  Property management difficulties with major landmark buildings. 
•  Emergence of smaller specialist fund managers and specialised investment funds. 
•  Growth in the indexed funds and need for responsive portfolio re-weightings. 
•  Diversification difficulties concerning premium property. 
 
These developments will clearly have a significant sustained impact on both direct and 
indirect property investment levels among institutional investors (Newell and Fife, 1995: 
pg 8-19).  
 
According to respondents of this study, the most significant advantages of property 
securitization are: 
 
•  Access to higher value assets. 
•  Investment spread. 
•  Liquidity of investment. 
•  Management cost efficiencies. 
 
The most significant disadvantages are:  
 
•  Lack of directional control. 
•  Potential illiquidity. 
•  Higher cost/lower return. 
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2.3 MANAGERIAL OPPORTUNISM 
 
Ooi, (2000) highlights managerial opportunism as especially relevant in the corporate 
governance of property companies where managers have numerous opportunities to 
exercise their discretion in property matters. Due to the longer horizon associated with 
property investment, managers are usually subjected to less pressure to provide 
immediate results compared to their counterparts in other sectors (Ooi, 2000: pg 316-
331). Since the 'irrelevance theorem' of Modigliani and Miller, (1958), there has been a 
consensus in the corporate finance literature that financial structure irrelevant in the 
valuation of a firm. Hence, one of the most important financial decisions corporate 
managers face is deciding on the amount of debt and equity in a firm’s capital structure.. 
In the presence of managerial opportunism, Jensen and Meckling, (1976) propose that an 
important role of debt is to pre-commit the firm to pay out its free cash flows. 
Accordingly, debt acts as a disciplining device that constrains the amount of funds 
available for managerial opportunism (Ooi, 2000: pg 316-331).  
 
The financial reports showed the ownership levels of companies and investors holding 
5% or more equity shares in the companies (Ooi, 2000: pg 316-331). Using the 
measurement adopted by Agrawal and Mandelker, (1990) and Martin (1996), they 
defined management shareholdings as the percentage of shares owned and controlled 
(both directly and indirectly) by all the company's officers and directors. The definition 
also includes property company shares that are held in trusts that are not directly 
controlled by the directors but are nevertheless benefiting them (Ooi, 2000: pg 316-331).  
 
Outside block shareholders include all investors with shareholdings of at least 5% that are 
either not affiliated to the management or have no representation on the board of directors 
(Ooi, 2000: pg 316-331). Such outside block shareholders are usually institutional 
investors, such as insurance companies that chose to leave the day-to-day running of the 
property company to the management team, even though they hold a substantial interest 
in the firm (Ooi, 2000: pg 316-331). Ooi, (2000) considers this category of investors as 
most likely to monitor managers closely and have the muscle, if necessary, to oppose 
management's decisions.  
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Inside and outside ownership are, as expected, inversely related. This means that 
companies with low management ownership are usually those with large outside block 
ownership and vice versa.  Professionally managed firms also tend to strive for faster 
growth rate than owner-managed firms. This is hardly surprising considering that 
remuneration and power base are often linked to the size of the portfolio under a 
manager's charge (Ooi 2000: pg 316-331), and hence, the manager’s inclination towards 
empire building and managerial entrenchment activities.  
 
There is a lot of scope for managerial opportunism in the corporate governance of 
property companies, which consequently has important implications on real estate 
practice and research. To attract investors and raise funds, managers of property 
companies need to assure outside investors that they would get a fair return on their 
investment. 
 
2.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LISTED FUNDS 
 
Corporate governance, according to Bonnafous-Boucher (2005), is part of an 
interdependent bundle of governances. In this respect, it occupies an important position in 
governance and its principles are consolidating. Its objective is essentially to perfect the 
principles of governance applied in what Chandler terms “big business”. The  essential 
meaning of all governance is to reveal the transformation taking place in power 
mechanisms and the wavering of the idea of sovereignty and to expose the precarious 
equilibrium between principles of sovereignty and legitimacy based on shareholder value 
that is open to question by stakeholders (Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47). 
 
Governance designates the entire raft of rules and practices – those that are in gestation 
and those that are being put through their paces – which are the object of incessant 
compromise within an organisation, whether its juridical status is private or public. 
Governance, unlike government, is characterised by this compromise, which must always 
be renewed between the various actors who produce the rules, as if the stability of the 
principles of governance were not only historical, but also uncertain (Bonnafous-
Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47).  
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In the context of corporate governance, the producers of rules are the shareholders and 
the stakeholders. Both influence corporate governance and are affected by it, but the first 
govern with the increase in the value of their shares and thus of their representation on 
governing bodies in mind. The other are, to some degree, governed by the power of 
shareholders since they relativise that power by appealing to values that are, if not 
alternative, at least complimentary. Yet certain forms of governance are more successful 
than others (Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47). 
 
Governance, thus defined, is in search of  its legitimacy beyond its member states, but 
which invites a more direct relationship with a civil society composed of stakeholders 
(Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47). Corporate governance is rarely considered from 
the point of view of compromise and the instability of rules except, insofar as the 
interests of stakeholders and shareholders are concerned. Furthermore, there is a 
hierarchical difference between stakeholders with direct and indirect rights. Typologies 
are drawn up that trace a line between a share value and a partnership value of a firm, and 
also between organisational performance and the search for stakeholder legitimacy. How 
these interests are taken into account depends on the definition of a “stakeholder”.  
 
Many theorists establish a hierarchy between direct and indirect stakeholders 
(Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47). However, corporate governance is generally 
regarded as the body of principles and rules that guide and limit the actions of directors. 
This clear yet restrictive approach is established on the basis of 'agency theory' where the  
firm is a nexus of contracts, and governance is a way of controlling managers via 
shareholder-creditors. Governance is thus focused on the balance between management 
and shareholders (Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47). The profits generated on the 
financial markets are thus indicators of efficiency and governance is the technical result 
of a process of financial optimisation, the cost of the agency versus the profits generated.  
 
The life of companies, according to Bonnafous-Boucher (2005), is governed by the whole 
body of operational and control rules in a given historical framework. Corporate 
governance is that which covers all the mechanisms whose effect is to limit powers and 
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influence decisions, or, in other words, which governs the behaviour of companies and 
define discretionary boundaries. Bonnafous-Boucher describes the coherent ensemble of 
institutional frameworks of the firm and the types of behaviour that enable it to function, 
emphasising that governance stands in contrast to management.  
 
The most popular approach to governance studies is ways of increasing the efficiency of 
its mechanisms. The major variants are found in contexts that are more or less propitious 
to the development of corporate governance (Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47). The 
relationship, by posing questions about the nature of duality of the political and the 
economic – their sacrosanct separateness – also calls into question recent compromise- 
based models in that the bottom line in corporate governance is that, after all, effective 
decision-making powers fall to those who hold capital. Corporate governance is 
assimilated to the principles that govern relations between shareholders and stakeholders 
(Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47).  
 
Corporate governance is based on two interpretations of the Lockean liberal logic 
(Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47). When this logic is used to address the strict 
separation of powers between shareholders and managers, its interest is confined to 
existing shareholders, even when they represent institutional investors represented by 
pension funds. Thus a functionalist approach to corporate governance is justified for two 
reasons. First, because there is permanent state of conflict between the various actors of 
the firm around how generated wealth should be shared, and second, because it is 
impossible to predict every conflict that is likely to arise in the future and to propose ex 
ante solutions (Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005: pg 34-47).  
 
2.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
 
Shleifer and Vishny, (1997) formally define corporate governance as the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. It is  a set of mechanisms designed to protect investors against expropriation 
by insiders and management. Some of these mechanisms include large block investors, 
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board independence and composition, legal protections and external market control via 
debt issuance (Fan, Sing, Ong and Sirmans, 2004: pg 414-434). The potential problems in 
governance structures in many modern corporations are the agency problems that arise 
from separating the ownership, the management and the suppliers of finance (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997: pg 737-783). Information symmetry between the three parties could be 
mitigated by optimal designs.  
 
2.5.1 Large Block Investors 
The ability of individual investors to exert significant influence on corporation 
management via his/her voting rights is limited when investment shareholdings are 
dispersed (Fan, Sing, Ong and Sirmans, 2004: pg 414-434). By concentrating 
shareholdings in a small number of investors, large block investors have been found 
to be effective in solving governance problems in the modern corporations (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Large investors, usually represented by institutional investors, 
possess professional knowledge and asset management skills, are more able to carry 
out effective monitoring and control of the managers' activities. 
 
2.5.2 Legal Protection 
Minority shareholders and creditors are well protected by the law against 
expropriation by controlling the shareholders or managers (Fan, Sing, Ong and 
Sirmans 2004: pg 414-434). If managers act in their own interest, minority investors 
have the legal right to extract their investment returns from the managers (Fan, Sing, 
Ong and Sirmans 2004: pg 414-434). Creditors, who possess legal aliens on the 
firm’s assets, have the power to repossess and dispose of the mortgage assets in the 
case of default. Shareholders can also exercise their voting rights to replace an 
inefficient board of directors (Porta, 1998). 
 
2.5.3. Board Composition 
The board of directors is an important organizational mechanism for monitoring and 
disciplining the management’s activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The board of a 
public firm is usually composed of independent outside directors and executive or 
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inside directors. The number of outside directors on the board is an indication of the 
board’s independence (Fan, Sing, Ong and Sirmans, 2004: pg 414-434). The outside 
directors play an important role in resolving agency problems between the 
management and the shareholders, and to ensure that minority shareholders’ interests 
are fairly represented in the firm (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989) 
 
2.5.4. Debt issuance and external market control 
Debt is an effective mean of disciplining managers and reducing agency costs (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976: pg 305-360). Debt issuance creates an effective external control 
to discipline managers’ action by cutting down on free cash flows that they can spend 
at their discretion (Fan, Sing, Ong and Sirmans, 2004: pg 414-434). The threat of 
liquidation also forces the managers to generate sufficient cash flows to meet the 
periodic debt repayment needs (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; 
Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1989). The managers’ reputations will be at stake if they 
fail to meet the debt repayment obligation of the firm (Diamond, 1989: pg 393-414). 
 
Real estate assets differ due to their unique locations and architectural characteristics. 
Sirmans, (1999) has identified three major features of real estate transactions that are the 
main causes of governance problems – the non-standardisation of the product, 
information asymmetry and the potential for generating quasi-rents that must be 
distributed ex post. The management’s action (hidden action) is not observable. It is 
difficult for the investors to force the fund managers to pick a pareto-optimal managerial 
action. Investors can only set appropriate incentive structures that will condition the 
management’s utility to the observable variables, and thus eliminate the moral hazard 
problem (Fan, Sing, Ong and Sirmans, 2004: pg 414-434).  
 
A professional management company (servicer) was normally appointed by the fund 
managers to perform the day-to-day operations of the underlying properties, the 
collection of rental incomes or the provision of services to property tenants (Fan, Sing, 
Ong and Sirmans, 2004: pg 414-434). Other than these routine functions, the fund 
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managers are also required to carry out cash flow management, property tenant services, 
monitoring underlying property conditions and reporting duties. It must also ensure that 
rental revenue collections are distributed as coupon payments to the investors. Embedded 
options, if not fairly executed, could be the roots of potential managerial conflicts and 
governance problems.  
 
Other factors that can cause potential governance problems are: 
•  Rental guarantees which provide a form of credit enhancement for bond investors, 
which not only mitigates the financial uncertainty but also helps to protect the 
investor from expropriation. Such lease-back arrangements remove the 
uncertainty associated with the management of the leases and transfer the risk, 
which will have to ensure that the property is competitively leased at market rate 
and is well maintained.   
•  Board independence and composition.  
•  Managerial relationships between fund managers and the property manager. 
•  Compensating property managers on gross rather than net income.  
 
The incentive contract is widely used in publicly-held companies to control corporate 
governance problems. It aims to align managerial behaviour with the interest of 
shareholders by strengthening the link between managers’ interest and corporate 
performance (Fan, Sing, Ong and Sirmans, 2004: pg 414-434). It can adopt various forms 
such as basic salary, cash bonuses, stock options, and performance-based dismissal 
threat. Basic salaries are determined by firm-external salary levels, which are 
independent of the firm’s performance, whereas, cash bonuses are usually linked to the 
current firm accounting earnings and/or stock market returns, and are used to reward 
managers for a firm’s short-term performance. Stock options are effective long-term 
financial incentives to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders (Ezzamel and 
Watson, 1997). Murphy (1985) shows that without the stock options, the effect of 
managerial remuneration on corporate performance is quite limited (Barro and Barro, 
1990). The focus in property seems to have been on income generation, not always NOI, 
and hence the cost side of the equation. 
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The institutional arrangements to control managerial behaviour in corporations in 
Western countries is either the Anglo-American (or “outsider”) model of corporate 
governance or the German-Japanese (or “insider”) model ( Stephen and Backhaus2003) 
In Germany and Japan the stock market does not operate as a market for corporate 
control.  
 
The major German financial institutions, which control around 60% of the country's 
market equity (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003: pg 389-468), perform the supervisory 
function associated with the stock in the Anglo-American system. The banks themselves 
only own around 10% of the equity but control a significant proportion of other shares by 
holding shares of their own depositors. However, there is evidence that the performance 
of German companies is a function of the size of the shareholding owned by the banks 
rather than those controlled by them (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003: pg 389-468). There 
are also a significant number held by companies. It is usually argued that a small number 
of shareholders with significant shareholdings is more active in monitoring managerial 
performance than a large number of small shareholders. The latter group generates a free 
riding problem: as individual shareholders only make small gains relative to the costs of 
active monitoring, they are better off free-riding  on the monitoring efforts of others 
(Stephen and Backhaus, 2003: pg 389-468). Where shareholdings are concentrated, the 
gains to the shareholder are greater and active monitoring is more likely to occur. As 
argued above, the generally low level of individual shareholder’s stake limits the 
possibility of a take-over (Jackson, 1994). However, collusion between insiders 
(managers) can  produce a bias towards the status quo and resistance to change, which 
can  increase the wealth of  small shareholders (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003: pg 389-
468). 
 
According to some economists (like Prodham, 1993), the two-tiered board system partly 
explains Germany’s post-war prosperity. By clearly separating the duties of the managing 
board of the senior management and the supervisory board, which represents the 
stakeholders' interests, the company can ensure  a clear division in roles with respect to 
its day-to-day management and long-term  planning (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003: pg 
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389-468). However, the system has recently come under criticism because key 
supervisory board members are increasingly seen to be members of a number of such 
boards and are alleged only maintain their own interests (Prodhan, 1993; Kaplan, 1994). 
It has also been argued that with the banks' greater access to information, this system 
reduces transaction costs and increases efficiency (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003: pg 389-
468). 
 
2.6 LOCAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
 
In 1994, the King Committee on Corporate Governance, headed by former High Court 
judge, Mervyn King S.C., published the King Report on Corporate Governance 
(hereafter referred to as King 1) which   incorporated a Code of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct. This was the first of its kind in the country and was aimed at promoting the 
highest standards of corporate governance in South Africa. Over and above the financial 
and regulatory aspects of corporate governance, King 1 advocated an integrated approach 
to good governance in the interests of a wide range of stakeholders. Although 
groundbreaking at the time, the evolving global economic environment, together with 
recent legislative developments, necessitated an updated report.  In 2002, the committee 
developed the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, 2002, referred to 
as King 2. 
 
King 2 acknowledges that there is a move away from the single bottom line, that is, profit 
for shareholders, to a triple bottom line, which embraces the economic, environmental 
and social aspects of a company’s activities. In the words of the King Committee: 
 
“…successful governance in the world in the 21st century requires companies to adopt an 
inclusive and not exclusive approach. The company must be open to institutional activism 
and there must be greater emphasis on the sustainable or non-financial aspects of its 
performance. Boards must apply the test of fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency to all acts or omissions and be accountable to the company but also 
responsive and responsible towards companies identified stakeholders. The correct 
balance between conformance with governance principles and performance in an 
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entrepreneurial market economy must be found, but this will be specific to each 
company.” 
 
King 2 guides the following aspects of corporate governance in South Africa: 
•  Directors and their Responsibilities 
•  Risk Management 
•  The Internal Audit Function 
•  Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
•  Accounting and Auditing 
•  Compliance and Enforcement 
 
To prevent the Code from becoming too burdensome, and because it is largely non-
prescriptive, compliance is for the most part treated as a matter between boards and 
company stakeholders.  The Code encourages greater activism by shareholders, business 
and the financial press and relies heavily on disclosure as a regulatory mechanism. The 
legal mechanisms for enforcement King 2 and the Code of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct are: 
 
•  Existing legal remedies, principally under the Companies Act (such as section 
424, which deals with the liability of directors and others for the fraudulent or 
reckless conduct of a company’s business) and the common law. 
•  The provisions of the amended listing requirements of the JSE. 
 
In this regard, it is important to note that King 2 recommends a number of changes and 
developments to existing legislation and enforcement processes to ensure that role-
players do not merely pay lip service to the Code and the provisions of King 2. Boards 
should implement effective measures to achieve compliance with the Code and the 
provisions of King 2 and should closely monitor corporate governance issues in order to 
ensure that they are not caught unawares by changes and developments.  
 
The findings contained in KPMG’s 1997/98 corporate governance survey, its third and 
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the second since JSE-listed companies were required to state their level of compliance 
with King’s recommendations, found that despite complying with the King Report on 
Corporate Governance, companies in South Africa continue to lag behind their 
international counterparts in embracing the spirit of best business practice.  
 
 The survey findings show a similar trend to the previous two, with gradual 
improvements in the level of disclosure, according to KPMG partner Sergio de Castro, 
(1998). In essence, while South African companies are willing to adhere to the King 
Report's minimum standards of compliance, they are making little headway in revealing 
the finer details of the more sensitive and important business issues. One of the key 
reasons for this is the lack of shareholder activism in South Africa compared with other 
countries (De Castro, 1998).  
 
South Africa should pre-empt an increase in shareholder activism by implementing and 
formalizing corporate governance practices that go beyond the minimum level required 
by the King Code and meet the latest international standards. For instance, South African 
institutions are not major proxy voters at company meetings, but there is a move 
internationally to make voting obligatory and such trends are likely to seep through into 
South Africa’s increasing globalised economy. The areas where disclosure is still lagging 
include policies, terms and conditions of directors’ appointment and retirement, 
assessment of board performance, the manner in which directors’ salaries are determined, 
disclosure of directors’ emoluments, training of new directors, the approach to risk 
management and implementation of a code of ethics.  
 
The assessment of board performance is an area not covered by the King report but is 
increasingly being insisted upon by international institutional investors. De Castro (1998) 
argues that much of the lack of qualitative compliance can be attributed to a lack of 
guidance from the King report and other international corporate governance codes. 
Globilisation will also play a role as South African companies look for foreign listings 
and find themselves forced to comply with such requirements.  
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The great strides that have been made in corporate governance internationally have still 
to be made locally. Parastatals, companies and government departments that shy away 
from such issues may soon have nowhere to turn, given increasing peer group pressure, 
shareholder activism and the potential for fresh legislation. 
 
2.7 AGENCY THEORY 
 
Agency theory, according to Doherty and Quinn, (1999), is based on the principal-agent 
relationship, where the ‘principal’ is an individual or group of individuals who control a 
set of economic functions or assets in some form of ownership of property rights. The 
‘agent’ is delegated by the ‘principal’ to control these assets and functions and operate 
them on their behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: pg 305-360). In the standard theory of 
control, shareholders are the principals in the relationship and management are the agents 
(Doherty and Quinn, 1999: pg 224-236). 
 
Agency theory, derived from the work of Jensen and Meckling, (1976), and Fama and 
Jensen, (1983), is another approach to corporate governance (Adams, 1994: pg 8-12). 
Jensen (1983), distinguishes it  from the more general and abstract mechanism which is  
concerned with deriving constraints to apply to an optimising problem to ensure that 
agents maximize the principles utility. In contrast, agency theory seeks to explain 
observed institutional structures as attempts to control the behaviour of agents (Adams, 
1994: pg 8-12). It focuses on the individual economic agent as a utility maximiser. 
Organisations are composed of different agents, each seeking to maximize their own 
utility, subject to constraints (Adams, 1994: pg 8-12). Managers in a shareholder-owned 
corporation will make different decisions from those of the owner-manager in a classical 
capitalist firm. However, the managers will bring skills and knowledge to the firm, which 
the owners do not. The divorce between ownership and control is seen as an aspect of 
specialization or the division of labour: owners specialize in the supply of capital; 
managers specialize in the supply of management skills (Adams, 1994: pg 8-12). The 
cost of this specialization is the agency problem: as utility maximisers, managers will not 
necessarily operate a company in the interest of the shareholders.  
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The positive literature on agency theory is concerned with exploring the extent to which 
different forms of organization constrain such managerial behaviour. With corporations, 
the constraints come from the stock market, in its role as the market for corporate control 
and the market for managers themselves (Adams, 1994: pg 8-12). An essential feature of 
this approach is the assumption that the stock market will discount a company's value 
because of the risk of managers diverting resources to maximize their utility rather than 
that of the shareholders. However, managers do incur bonding costs to signal to 
shareholders that they are operating in the shareholders' interest (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 
Agency theory postulates that the firm consists of contracts between the owners of 
economic resources (the principles) and managers (the agents) who are charged with 
using and controlling those resources. Furthermore, it is based on the premise that agents 
have more information than principals which adversely affects the principals’ ability to 
monitor effectively whether their interests are being well served by agents. It also 
assumes that principals and agents act rationally and that they will use the contracting 
process to maximize their wealth. Thus because agents have self-seeking motives, they 
are likely to take the opportunity to act against the interests of the owners of the firm 
(Adams, 1994: pg 8-12). This occurs when the principal or owner does not have access to 
all available information at the time a manager makes a decision and thus cannot 
determine whether the manager's actions are in the best interest of the firm.  
 
Scapens argues that a state of efficiency, or “pareto-optimality”, exists in the contracting 
process, where both principals and agents incur contracting costs. For instance, to 
minimise the risk of shirking by agents, principals will monitor expenditures, for example 
the costs of subjecting financial statements to external audit scrutiny (Adams, 1994: 8-
12). Agents, on the other hand, incur bonding costs, for example the cost of an internal 
audit, in order to signal to the principal or owner that they are acting responsibly and in a 
manner consistent with their contract of employment. Such action also helps managers to 
secure their positions in the firm and to protect their salary levels. Wallace argues that the 
principal’s expenditures for monitoring services, like internal auditing, reduce the risk of 
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principals making adverse adjustments to executive compensation. 
 
For Pass (2003), executive incentive schemes are aimed at rewarding the executive 
directors of the company for improving the financial performance of the company’s 
shareholders. Both practitioners and academics regard incentive schemes as powerful 
reward mechanisms for “reconciling the “principal-agent” issue. The shareholders or 
principals as owners of the company hire salaried professional executive directors as 
agents to manage the affairs of the company on their behalf. Executive incentive schemes 
can thus foster maximum goal congruence to the mutual benefit of both groups 
(Greenbury, 1995; Hempel, 1998; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
A long-term executive incentive scheme is  a “motivator” for the company’s executive 
directors (as appointed “agents”) to focus on improving the financial performance of the 
company and by doing so, to align their interests more closely with those of the 
shareholders (“principals”) –(Pass, 2003: pg 299-304). By linking a substantial amount of 
the executives’ own remuneration to an improvement in corporate performance brings 
about a greater commitment to the creation of shareholder wealth (Pass, 2003: pg 299-
304).  
 
Since the release of the Greenbury Report in 1995, the use of conditional incentive pay 
schemes has become widely accepted as constituting part of a wider system of corporate 
governance “best practice”  (as recommended by the Cadbury Report (1992) and Hempel 
Report (1998)). The Greenbury Report specifically recommends the adoption of 
conditional executive incentive pay systems as “best practice”.    
 
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) suggest that separating ownership and management creates 
a potential conflict of interest between the two parties. Certain mechanisms perform 
much needed monitoring functions to ensure that firm management behaves in a manner 
consistent with maximizing shareholder wealth.  
 
Consequently, agency theory contributes to the problem of corporate governance, which 
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different organisational forms will evolve to deal with the agency problems which arise 
from the attenuation of property rights.  
 
2.8  REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITs) 
 
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) are a special form of corporation created in the 
USA in 1960 to encourage liquidity and to improve efficiency of capital allocation in the 
real estate sector (Campbell and Sirmans, 2002). REITs are not required to pay taxes on 
net income as long as they are  distributed to shareholders, where of course they are  
taxed at the shareholder level (Campbell and Sirmans, 2002: pg 388-405). Thus REITs 
allow individuals and institutions to make equity investments in real estate without 
incurring the high transaction costs related to direct investment. At the same time, they 
avoid the burden of double taxation. The tax advantage comes at a considerable cost to 
REITs, since it requires the acceptance of a restrictive institutional structure designed to 
limit unfair competition with taxable corporations (Campbell and Sirmans, 2002: pg 388-
405).  
 
According to Campbell and Sirmans, (2002) the three key elements that are of essential 
importance in the structure of REITs are: 
 
•  Their assets and revenues are closely restricted to real estate, plus a limited 
portfolio of securities. 
•  Although they are usually public companies, they can avoid paying corporate 
taxes, so that their owners are not subjected to the double taxation normally 
associated with public corporations. 
•  They are required to distribute essentially all their accounting earnings, so that 
they become taxable at the investor level. 
 
Regarding the first element, a US REIT must derive at least 75% of its gross income from 
real estate, and at least 90% from the combination of real estate and its securities 
portfolio. Further limitations are imposed upon the securities portfolio itself (Campbell 
and Sirman, 2002: pg 388-405). The REIT may not hold more than 10 % of the 
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outstanding voting securities of any one issuer, and no more than 5% of its total assets 
may consist of the securities of any one issuer, unless that issuer is another REIT 
(Campbell and Sirman, 2002: pg 388-405).  
 
Other important restrictions are imposed even when income is derived from real estate. 
The tax rules specify that the REIT may not obtain more than 30% of its income from the 
sum total of securities held for less than one year, and property held for less than four 
years (Campbell and Sirman, 2002: pg 388-405). This is to restrict the REIT’s ability to 
compete with developers and brokers by building or acquiring properties for sale, to 
prevent brokers from  building or acquiring properties for sale and to prevent the REIT 
from engaging heavily in securities trading,  
 
Regarding the matter of corporate taxation, REITs are able to avoid corporate taxes 
because they are authorized to claim an income tax deduction for dividends paid. First, 
taxable income is computed in the usual manner using generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP earnings) (Campbell and Sirman, 2002: pg 388-405). Dividends paid 
to shareholders are then deducted from taxable earnings, up to a maximum of 100%. 
Dividends paid in excess of earnings cannot be carried forward. (Campbell and Sirman, 
2002: pg 388-405).  
 
Regarding the matter of income distribution, to assure that personal income taxes are 
assessed at the investor level, the tax rules require REITs to pay out at least 90% of 
earnings. In order to achieve full deduction, however, most REITs pay out at least 100% 
GAAP earnings (Campbell and Sirman, 2002: pg 388-405). REITs usually elect to pay 
out more than 100% of accounting earnings, obtaining the extra cash flow that is exuded 
from earnings because of the depreciated tax shelter.  
 
In addition to these three elements, , US REITs are subject to a prolific set of restrictions 
on their structure, their financing and their operations, to reduce unfair competition with 
taxable entities (Campbell and Sirman, 2002: pg 388-405).  
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Campbell and Sirman, (2002) suggest the advantages and disadvantages of adopting the 
REIT structure are: 
 
Potential Advantages: 
•  It provides greater liquidity in domestic real estate markets, which leads to a more 
efficient allocation of capital.  
•  It provides greater price stability in local real estate markets, since REITs have 
access to alternative sources of financing through times of institutional credit 
rationing. 
•  It provides an opportunity for pension funds and other investors to achieve 
portfolio diversification benefits from real estate, without accepting the burden of 
double taxation, or paying large transactions costs associated with direct property 
ownership. 
•  It provides a potentially useful vehicle for privatizing the ownership of 
government property. 
•  It provides an enhanced ability of domestic firms to compete with tax-advantaged 
foreign real estate companies for control of local real estate.  
 
Potential disadvantages: 
•  It provides reduced revenues from corporate taxes, resulting in reallocation of tax 
burden to other firms, or to individuals. 
•  Taxable firms may find it difficult to compete with REITs because of their tax 
advantage, even though the taxable firms may have more operational flexibility. 
•  It provides reduced efficiency in the real estate business, since institutional 
limitations placed on REITs reduce their ability to adjust to market conditions.  
 
According to Campbell and Sirman, (2002) one of the main issues related to the structure 
of a REIT is whether REITS should be permitted to manage the properties of others. . In 
the USA, the level of activity permitted to REIT managers has undergone a clear 
evolution. When REITs were first authorized, equity managers were not permitted to 
operate the properties the REIT owned, and had to engage the services of external 
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management services. This was to prevent REITS from competing unfairly with taxable 
real estate operating companies.  
 
Since 2001, not only can US REITs manage their own properties, but they can also sell 
management services to others through taxable subsidiaries relative to the size of the 
REIT. However, this is severely limited to assure that the sale of management services 
does not become a REIT's primary activity. The new rule gives the REIT more operating 
flexibility, and diversifies its potential sources of income. At the same time, it creates a 
regulatory challenge for the Internal Revenue Service, which must now scrutinize the 
activities of these subsidiaries to try to prevent the inappropriate transfer of revenues out 
of the management subsidiary and into tax-advantaged REIT. 
 
Campbell and Sirman, (2002) also question whether REITs should be subjected to special 
disclosure requirements. One of the motivations for creating REITs is to develop an 
appropriate vehicle for individual investors to participate in the real estate market, 
allowing them to benefit from property value increases in ways other than through home 
ownership. It is important to these investors that REITs minimize information problems, 
and become as transparent as possible. It is not clear that market forces alone will result 
in optimal levels of disclosure. To the contrary, US REITs have created complex and 
controversial organisational structures in many cases, including privately held 
subsidiaries (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997: pg 433-56) and large joint ventures, many of them 
in Europe (Campbell and White-Huckins, 2001: pg 388-405). The degree of disclosure 
requirements include marking property values to market, identifying all preferred claims 
on cash flows and specifying  accounting standards for joint ventures.  
 
REITs are survivors, having been resilient from  their creation in 1960, their abuse in the 
1970’s tax laws changes, the reduction in real estate prices of the 1980’s and 1990’s 
through to  the volatile capital markets of the 2000’s (Scherrer, 2004: pg 78-82). REITs 
are typified by a small but growing market. Those that have survived have acquired other 
REITS and grown. Their structure provides some safety for investors that they cannot 
obtain in direct real estate investments (Scherrer, 2004: pg 78-82).  
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Poor management is not eliminated simply by choosing a REIT structure. In effect, a 
REIT election is merely a tax tool and high leverage and poor market selection can result 
in disaster.  Since loans to REITS are generally unsecured, investors and lenders need to 
be very concerned with cash flow and the REIT's ability to access long term capital 
(Scherrer, 2004: pg 78-82).  
 
The value of a REIT is the sum of the value of its underlying real estate assets with some 
bonus for excellent management. The investor's /and/or the lending risk is related to real 
estate and thus more market specific than the risk associated with a non-real estate 
company (Scherrer, 2004: pg 78-82). The investment or lending considerations must 
include specific market analysis and a determination of the REIT's ability to remain 
viable during conditions of market instability (Scherrer, 2004: pg 78-82). 
 
Scherrer (2004) argues that corporate governance in the REIT sector has been a topical 
issue with the institutional customer base. REITs carry the stigma of having the worst 
corporate governance relative to other public companies. In a recent report, Scherrer 
(2004) defines the “Weapons of Mass Entrenchment (WME)” which can hurt 
shareholders and entrench management. By reviewing structural issues such as staggered 
elections, the independence and alignment of interests of such board members, and the 
reputation and past practices of each board, he concludes that REITS have more WME 
than other companies. He measured three broadly grouped categories, the quality of the 
board being the most important. The second category was board power and the extent to 
which power is vested in directors, via WME, rather than in shareholders, where the 
power should be vested. The third category was the potential conflicts between key 
insiders and shareholders. He concluded that none of the companies scored an A and that 
the majority scored an F. This helped him confirm that poor governance is widespread 
across REITs.  
 
2.9 CONCLUSION / PROPOSITIONS 
 
The propositions that have been made obvious from the literature review are that the 
governance mechanisms of the South African listed property sector: as follows: 
 36
 •  Are  reflective of international standards  
•  Are reflective of local standards. .  
•  Protect shareholders interests  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
While research is important in both business and academic activities, there is no 
consensus in the literature on how it should be defined (Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar and 
Rita; 2002). One explanation for this is that research means different things to different 
people. However, from the many different definitions offered, there is agreement that 
research: 
 
•   Is a process of enquiry and investigation. 
•  Is systematic and methodical. 
•  Increases knowledge. 
 
There have been no research studies on governance mechanisms in listed property 
portfolio funds in South Africa.  A definition of a research strategy is a fundamental and 
necessary requirement for a sound empirical study in such a field. Qualitative research 
involves the use of qualitative data, such as interviews, documents, and participation 
observation, to understand and explain social phenomena. 
 
3.2  QUALITITATIVE RESEARCH PARADIGM 
 
This study investigates the potential conflict of interest in listed portfolio funds and the 
governance mechanism to protect shareholders interest. The proposed research paradigm 
for the study is qualitative in nature.  
 
Critics of empirical research (for example Blalock, 1991; Willer and Willer, 1973) 
focused on the deductive nature of the quantitative process, and the preoccupation which 
researchers supporting quantitative process have with statistical analysis to the detriment 
of quality data production. They claim that this narrow approach forces researchers to 
work within theory, rather than challenge or extend it. Qualitative research is often cast in 
the role of the junior partner in the research enterprise, and many of its exponents feel it 
should have more clout and more credit (Dey, 1993). 
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Supporters of qualitative research designs (for example, 1993; Piore, 1983; Stainback and 
Stainback, 1988; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Van Maanen, 1983) stress its 
potential for theory and development through rigorous coding and interpretive 
procedures. For Strauss and Corbin, (1990), the tasks of qualitative research are to 
uncover and understand what lies behind a little-known phenomenon or to gain a new or 
fresh perspective about a known one.  They also claim that qualitative methods can 
provide intricate details of phenomena that are difficult to convey with quantitative 
methods.. Those who support the qualitative approach claim that a deductive 
methodology constrains researchers within current theory, whereas an inductive method 
encourages theory development or theory extension (Jarratt, 1996: pg 6-15).  
 
3.3  QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The design of the research is qualitative and, more specifically, interpretative.  The 
motivation for conducting qualitative research is that it helps researches understand 
people and the social and cultural contexts within which they live. Kaplan and Maxwell 
(1994) argue that the goal of understanding a phenomenon from the point of view of the 
participants and its particular social and institutional context is largely lost when textual 
data are quantified.  
 
Qualitative research is not synonymous with interpretative research – qualitative research 
may or may not be interpretive, depending on the researcher's underlying philosophical 
assumptions. Interpretive research, philosophically based in hermeneutics and 
phenomenology (Boland, 1985), assumes that reality (given or socially-constructed) is 
only accessible through social constructions such as language, consciousness and shared 
meanings. Interpretive studies generally attempt to understand phenomena through the 
meanings that people assign to them and interpretive methods of research. Interpretive 
research does not predefine dependent and independent variables, but focuses on the 
complexity of human senses as the situation emerges (Kaplan and Maxwell, 1994). 
 
3.4  POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
 
This study's research population is the group of expert professionals in property field that 
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have an interest in the outcome of the governance mechanisms in the listed property 
portfolios. The sample includes consultants, chief executive officers, fund managers, 
portfolio managers and legislation that govern the securities exchange and corporate 
organisations. For the purpose of triangulation, the above stakeholder groupings are 
considered to be sufficient. 
 
Data triangulation, described by Jick (1983) as combined methodologies to study a 
specific phenomenon, can be either “between method” (providing cross-validation of 
outcomes) or “within method” (using a variety of techniques within a stated method to 
gather information about an aspect of the research that will confirm the outcome). 
Triangulation in its extreme can “capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual 
portrayal of the units under study” (Jick, 1983).  Jick provides a practical example of how 
to implement the concept of triangulation.  The effectiveness of all triangulation designs 
rests on the premise that the weakness of one method is compensated by the strength of 
another (Jick, 1983). The research method described by Jick, (1983) combined multiple 
viewpoints and approaches, gathered through direct and indirect reports, observation, 
surveys and semi-structured, probing, interviews.  
 
Simon, (1994) presents a generative strategy, incorporating the concept of triangulation 
and arguing the case for combining content analysis, in-depth interviews, participant 
observation and a review of the literature with open-ended, non-standardised schedule 
interviews. His ideal research method is supplementing an analysis of information 
gathered from secondary data and literature reviews with a variety of in-depth interviews. 
He also recommends  including two phases of qualitative research using in-depth 
interviews followed by structured, open-ended qualitative interviews to “flesh out”  
themes produced through initial unstructured interviews. 
 
The research was conducted using twenty respondents. The sample size is drawn from 
experts in the industry and is relatively small due to the limited number of listed property 
industry players.  
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STUDY RESPONDENTS 
No. ORGANISATION SECTOR NAME DESIGNATION 
1 Broll Property Group Property Services Arnold 
Meyer 
CEO 
2 Redefine  Listed Fund Grant 
Abrahams 
Asset Manager 
3 Apexhi Listed Fund Gerald 
Leissner 
CEO 
4 Grayprop Listed Fund John Rainier CEO 
5 RMB Properties Property Warren 
Schultz 
CEO 
6 EMIRA Listed Fund James 
Templeton 
CEO 
7 Catalyst Securities Fund Managers Andre Stadler CEO 
8 Ambit Listed Fund Kelly Clinton  
9 Investec Properties: 
Provest 
Listed Fund Angelique de 
Rauville 
Chief Executive 
10 Pangbourne 
Properties 
Property 
Management 
Johan 
Groenwald 
Company 
Secretary 
11 Madison Asset 
Managers 
Fund Managers Wolfe 
Cesman 
 
12 Standard Bank 
Properties 
Property Stuart Shaw- 
Taylor 
Managing 
Director 
13 Brait Financial 
(Investments) 
Mervyn King Senior Chairman 
14 Spearhead Listed Fund Mike Flax CEO 
15 Resilient Properties Listed Fund Des de Beer CEO 
16 Old Mutual Properties Listed Fund Colin Young Asset Manager 
17 Hyprop Listed Fund Pieter 
Prinsloo 
CEO 
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18 Standard Bank  Economics Elna 
Moolman 
Economic 
Analyst 
19 FNB Economics John Loos Economic 
Analyst 
20 Financial Mail Media Ian Fife Property Writer 
 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION 
 
The interviewee was contacted initially by telephone to inform them of the purpose of the 
study, subjects to be covered and the research process, including the expected duration of 
the interview.  The interviewee was then invited to participate in the study and an 
interview was set-up. Each interviewee was offered a copy of the research proposal, as an 
incentive to participate in the study. Importantly, interviewees were guaranteed that their 
responses would be held confidential and remain anonymous.  
 
To put the interviewees at ease in talking to the researcher, the interviews took place at 
the most convenient place for the interviewees. Each interview was audio-taped and 
transcribed thereafter. In addition, notes were taken in case of equipment failure. 
 
In-depth interviews, being one approach to qualitative research, can be either non-
directive or semi-structured (Sampson, 1972). In non-directive interviews, a relaxed and 
sympathetic relationship must be developed between the interviewer and the interviewee, 
and probing should not cause bias in responses. When the interviewee digresses or 
exploration of a particular area becomes fruitless, the interviewer must guide the session 
back to the relevant topic.  
 
In semi-structured interviews, the researcher can cover a specific list of topic areas, 
leaving the time allocated to each topic area to the interviewer's discretion.  The open 
structure ensures that unexpected facts or attitudes can be more easily explored 
(Sampson, 1972: pg 7-27). 
 
By selecting a non-threatening environment, the interviewer can encourage the, 
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interviewee to look within themselves for the underlying motivations behind their 
perceptions (Jarratt, 1996: pg 6-15). Furthermore, with no right or wrong answers, the 
interviewee is positioned as “the expert”.   
 
The researcher must refrain from using judgmental statements or questions that might be 
interpreted as threatening and evaluative (Jarratt, 1996: pg 6-15) and the interviewer must 
maintain control of the interview, instilling confidence in the interviewee so that opinions 
expressed are perceived as simply being recorded rather than judged (Reynolds and 
Gutman, 1988). This approach ensures that emerging issues, as well as those suggested 
through previous research, are included in the research, develop an in-depth 
understanding of key dimensions and provide the researcher with valuable information 
for interpreting quantitative data (Jarratt, 1996: pg 6-15). 
 
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The data analysis of this study was cyclical. It first involved collecting and analysing the 
data and then referred back to the literature. While quantitative research usually involves 
a clear distinction between data gathering and data analysis, this is problematic with 
qualitative research (Myers, 1997). For example, from a hermeneutic perspective, it is 
assumed that the researcher’s presuppositions affect the gathering of data – that the 
questions informants are asked largely determine the outcome.  The analysis affects the 
data, which in turn affects the analysis in significant ways. Consequently, in qualitative 
research, it is perhaps more accurate to speak of “modes of analysis” or different 
approaches to gathering data, analyzing and interpreting qualitative data - than to speak 
of “data analysis” (Myers, 1997). The common thread is that all qualitative modes of 
analysis are concerned primarily with textual analysis, whether verbal or written. 
 
Hermeneutics can be treated as both an underlying philosophy and specific mode of 
analysis (Bleicher, 1980). As a philosophical approach to human understanding, it 
provides the philosophical grounding for interpretivism. As a mode of analysis, it 
suggests a way of understanding textual data. The idea of a hermeneutic circle refers to 
the dialectic between the understanding of the text as a whole and the interpretation of its 
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parts, in which descriptions are guided by anticipated explanations (Gadamer, 1976). It 
follows that we expect meaning from the context of what has gone before. As Gadamer 
(1976) explains, “It is a circular relationship….The anticipation of meaning in which the 
whole, themselves also determine this whole.” Ricoeur (1974) suggests that 
“Interpretation … is the work of thought, which consists in deciphering the hidden 
meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal 
meaning.” Different stakeholders in an industry can have confused, incomplete and 
contradictory views on many issues. The aim of the hermeneutic analysis is to make 
sense of the whole and the relationship between the different stakeholders. In addition, 
the data is coded and tabulated, depicting the various opinions throughout the sector. No 
statistical analysis is performed. 
 
3.7 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
 
As qualitative research methods are more intrusive and less structured than quantitative 
ones, they are more appropriate when the research is exploratory in nature, when the 
researcher is unfamiliar with the area for examination and when the research is clinical. 
In all these situations the interviewer must gain insight into a specific topic area.  
 
As judgments have to be made during the data collection phase, the researcher must 
understand the theoretical issues (Yin 1989) A review and knowledge of the literature is 
an integral part of the exploratory phase of data collection (Simon, 1994) and is an 
important source for  gaining “theoretical sensitivity” (Strauss and Cobin, 1990)  
 
The accuracy of verbal reports depends on the procedures used to elicit them and the 
relation between the requested information and the information provided (Ericsson and 
Simon, 1984).  Invalid reports can be due to lack of access to thoughts (their claim), 
inadequate procedures for eliciting verbal reports or requesting information that can not 
be provided, even when thoughts are accessible. When subjects are asked to recall 
instances, investigators find the retrieval information to be valid (Ericsson and Simon, 
1984). Thus, qualitative interviews should encourage the respondent to describe the 
phenomenon under investigation. 
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
With the inherent risk of data being distorted by the introduction of bias, added to the 
practicality of data collection, it is imperative that the most appropriate and effective 
research design is carefully selected. 
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4.  CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION OF 
RESULTS 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate and discuss the results of the in-depth, semi-
structured interviews conducted with the respondents. Representatives of half of the 40 
funds currently listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were interviewed. All are 
senior managers - CEOs and Managing Directors - and all are well-respected in the 
industry, which supports and validates the data.  
 
The interviews were successful and the interviewees were enthusiastic in their responses, 
provided their identity would remain anonymous. The interviewees felt comfortable, and 
were forthcoming and candid in providing information.  The data drawn from the 
interviews and their analysis are discussed below. Comments from the transcribed 
interviews are used to provide additional insight into each of the factor associated with 
the protection of shareholders' interests in the listed property sector.  
 
The chapter begins by exploring the research results on corporate governance and the 
board framework, the factors that protect shareholders' interests. –This is followed by the 
results relating the listed property's different business practices - the asset management 
structures, promoters’ fees and directors' dealings. The chapter concludes by identifying 
other factors not associated with the main findings. 
 
4.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
  
Does good corporate governance pay? 
 
“….Who do you look to protect? Is it the tenants, we or the shareholders?  I would 
definitely say that the shareholders are what we are here for.” 
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Yes
No 
       
The majority of the respondents agreed that good corporate governance and management 
ethics pays.  
 
They recalled that about 20 years ago, the property industry was in the hands of a few 
institutions and a few listed funds. Those who thought they could make a quick profit saw 
an opportunity of promoting these listings. . The yields were high, there were arbitrage 
opportunities and funds were listed. The industry then crashed. As disgruntled vendors 
sold their properties and got their equity as cash, the equities of the properties devalued 
by half, leaving a great number of dissatisfied investors. This tainted the entire property 
sector market, and investors lost confidence in it.   Then new players with integrity came 
into the market and, in financial terms, brought sophistication to the property industry, 
which restored investors' faith in the industry. Perceptive investors with clever ideas 
about cash flows brought new ideas and fresh thinking to the industry and considered 
property a solid asset. Soon after, new property companies and other established funds 
came into the market, bringing with them funds from other countries and a whole new 
outlook to the property industry. This resulted in a major change in property asset 
management. Then a new system evolved which most companies now prescribe to - a 
more open manner of dealing with valuations and the establishment of the Investment 
Property Databank (IPD). Prior to this, none of the institutions would disclose the extent 
of their portfolios and no-one knew the true value of these investments. It was more a 
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mentality of secrecy and keeping the value of the investments artificial. 
 
Respondents argued that corporate governance is the defining issue of the 21st century, 
yet it is not the foremost issue for South African investors. In South Africa, the market 
has been driven by results, whereas internationally, investors are extremely vigilant about 
corporate governance. Today, corporate governance is reflected in the markets and good 
corporate governance reflects on the share price, which attracts more investors. The 
property market is also more sophisticated with many controls in place, particularly in the 
financial markets. Corporate governance is a combination of the reputation of the 
directors and the executive team, which adds value together with the governance 
mechanisms.  
 
For most of the respondents, the focus on corporate governance has been slightly 
overdone. They argue that the quality and ethics of management is of greater importance.  
One can have effective corporate governance, but if the management is unethical, there 
can be no positive results. However, with less corporate governance but with ethical 
management, some positive results can be achieved.  
 
Various governance processes and policies have emanated, mainly from the United States 
which has cost businesses huge amounts of time and money. While respondents are 
generally positive about the move to corporate governance as generally, they feel many 
areas are overdone .With ethical management, these processes are redundant. Putting 
corporate governance regulations in place can still result in unethical management.  
 
Are shareholders able to influence the way the industry is governed? 
 
“Shareholder apathy is a huge problem in South Africa.” 
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Yes
No 
 
 
While the majority of the respondents felt that block shareholders do influence the way 
the industry is governed, they are apathetic about governance regulations. Some felt this 
would change in time, with the smaller shareholders becoming more involved and 
exerting more influence.  
 
Shares are primarily held by institutions and are therefore in the control of asset managers 
who work on blanket decision-making within their organisations. Property is difficult to 
analyse, as simply examining financial reports is insufficient to determine whether 
properties are being managed in accordance with investors' expectations. The analysis 
needs to go beyond this and requires an in-depth knowledge of properties, such as how 
well they are being maintained, whether the parking meters are in working order and how 
effective the security is. This type of hands-on analysis provides insight to the underlying 
aspects of an individual building, which a financial report alone cannot provide. To 
provide an effective analysis, a manager must study the leases, build models, and 
determine what companies are likely to achieve from their earnings in future. They also 
need to know that the properties are being managed on a day to day basis in accordance 
with expectations. 
 
Respondents were of the opinion that companies such Old Mutual, Marriott, Stanlib, as 
major shareholders in a number of funds, should exert more influence in the sector. Most 
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of the major block shareholders seem to have a passive approach to issues such as the 
fees. If they are not content with them, they simply sell their shares. Respondents argued 
that the major shareholders should exert more influence since in many ways; they are 
equally responsible to the management or board of directors in determining how the 
sector should operate.  These are the players that can influence companies, either by 
changing the board or forcing the management to act responsibly. 
 
According to the respondents, shareholder activism in South Africa is becoming 
increasingly apparent and it is only a question of time before shareholders attending 
AGMs or meetings will start asking the pertinent questions. Legislation of these 
regulations will have to be introduced as South Africa is now falling behind the 
international markets. Shareholder activism will be a major factor in keeping companies 
and funds in line.   
 
How can managers assure outside investors that their interests are being looked 
after? 
 
“We can communicate with them until the cows come home but if we get no feedback, we 
don’t know what their thinking is, or whether their interests are being taken care of.” 
 
            
Delivery
Transparency
The Board
Can not
 
 The respondents were unanimous that managers can assure investors that their interests 
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are being looked after by being transparent, communicating often, meeting one-on-one 
and making sure that they have a good track record.  Through the board mechanism, 
managers can primarily communicate with their shareholders through the annual reports. 
Through the governance structures, i.e. the correct non-executives, the right investment 
committee processes and credibility on past transactions, they can communicate that 
these transactions have performed as they   predicted. In this way, the shareholders can be 
more confident that their interests were being looked after.  This is also achieved by 
having performance targets and by managing in accordance with Key Performance 
Indicators. 
 
Respondents generally felt that the share price is more important than corporate 
governance since investors tend to care more about the share price than about corporate 
governance.  They also felt that transparency in fees paid and the disclosure of promoters 
fees and all fees payable to the related bodies, is vital,  
 
Respondents also added that investors would be reassured that their interests were being 
looked after if funds could prove that they comply with the major points of the King 2 
report, which is designed specifically to protect shareholders and make sure companies 
run on a basis to ensure that protection.  
 
Is governance adhered to and does it deal with conflicts adequately? 
 
“I think it is, but here again too, is a set of rules and one can’t always stick to every 
rule.” 
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Yes
No
It tries to
 
 
The respondents stated that while their companies and/or funds are extremely serious 
about corporate governance, its success rate is not always measurable. While they make 
every effort to meet all the guidelines, they are not always successful. In general, it 
creates certainty amongst investors. Most of the respondents stated that governance is 
over emphasised and in fact detracts companies from focussing on their core business. 
 
As the King 2 report is merely a guideline, there are varying degrees of compliance with 
it. An examination of various properties in a report highlights the different items that are 
complied with within a reasonably broad band of parameters. However, many funds don’t 
pay sufficient attention to this. 
 
The respondents stated that the King 2 report exposes what the Companies Act says in 
one paragraph; the JSE regulations are exactly the same. From this perspective, the 
respondents find it useful but feel it has been over-emphasised and is generating a lot of 
income for some.  How they succeed in that is not always measurable. What they strive to 
do, what they can afford to do and what they actually achieve, are not necessarily what 
they want. They are still striving to do better. 
 
The respondents felt that by comparison, the regulations in accounting standards were 
relatively lax, but that after Enron and other related scandals, these became too stringent 
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It is felt that regulations are generally cyclical. Corporate governance improves in the 
long-term but at one point, it is overdone and a backlash occurs which eases it up 
somewhat.  It then becomes too lax, at which point a new cycle begins. While corporate 
governance was extremely important several years ago, people are now less focused on it 
because the market is performing well. In time, it will be fashionable again, and corporate 
governance will continue to improve. The respondents felt that much of business and life 
works according to such cycles. 
 
The respondents stated that a general opinion shared throughout the business community 
is that the introduction of accounting statements and standards has confused rather than 
enlightened investors. They have created information that is less meaningful for investors 
as they are difficult to interpret and are often illogical. Furthermore, a huge amount of 
effort is spent on complying with the standards. 
 
There are governance processes and policies emanating mainly from the US which has 
resulted in huge amounts of time and costs for businesses. The move to more governance 
is generally good but there are many areas that are overdone it is felt that if you have 
good ethical management all these processes are unnecessary as you can put all these 
regulations in place and still have unethical management. 
 
Do companies disclose all information? 
 
“I don’t think that disclosure is going to affect any practice and I am not sure that 
disclosure is going to add any value to anybody.” 
 
“This disclosure over disclosure over auditor over policeman!, Where do you 
stop?” 
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No
Try to
 
 
A few respondents felt that transparency, which provided information to one’s 
competitors, is counterproductive to competitiveness. They argued that what is significant 
is not the information one has but how that information is used.  With the directors, the 
auditors, and the JSE on the one hand, and the executives, non-executives and the 
independent directors on the other, it is questionable why independent directors can not 
ensure that the management adheres to good practice. Further disclosure should not be 
necessary as in an ideal world; all transactions within a company are vetted by an 
independent board of directors. 
 
Respondents felt this was similar to Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) schemes, 
which now require agencies to be rated. It was unclear to them who approve the ratings.  
It was felt that they are creating a whole new mechanism of 'checking on' people and a 
whole new industry, which adds further unproductive costs to companies. Furthermore, 
they argue that all the checking mechanisms are in fact making people more dishonest 
and dishonest people will eventually be caught.  
 
They concluded that, by definition, if something is 'material' it can influence an investor's 
decision; if it is not material, it can't. Thus only material transactions should be disclosed. 
Any other disclosure is irrelevant to decision-making and simply uses up resources.  
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Do you think good governance adds value to the shareholder? 
 
“It’s a hygiene factor. it doesn’t add value but it detracts from value if not in 
place.” 
 
         
No
Yes
Tries to
 
 
The majority of the respondents felt that good governance adds value, but that in the 
immediate future, it will create confusion and inconvenience and will not add much value 
to investors. Examples include Sarbo and Oxley and the new IFRS in the JSE listings 
requirements. Governance will serve to impede investors' understanding and will distract 
managers from their core task in the immediate future. The increase in compliance 
requirements has been positive in that it has focused attention on previous bad practices.  
It has weeded out management companies and individuals that act in their self-interest at 
the expense of shareholders. There were many examples of these in the past, but probably 
because of the increase in governance, there are less today.  
 
4.3 THE BOARD FRAMEWORK 
 
Do board members enforce effective measures to achieve compliance and corporate 
governance in SA? 
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“Good boards do, bad boards don’t. It depends entirely on the integrity of the 
board members.” 
 
         
Yes
No
Tries to
 
 
 The majority of respondents stated that boards try to enforce effective measures to 
achieve compliance. 
 
They felt that there are pros and cons for people to be on multiple boards, but that there 
should be a ceiling.  Directors and non-executive directors cannot be dictated to about the 
number of boards they can serve on, as this depends on the board and the level of 
involvement. It is useful for independent directors to be on several boards as they should 
have the necessary gumption to keep them in line. Furthermore, they can attract business 
from one company to another. This is networking and directors should not be penalised 
for this.    
 
Certain respondents felt hat board structures undermine the basic principles of business. 
They feel that the principle of ‘he, who pays the piper, calls the tune’ is being 
overlooked. They also feel that it is incorrect to say that the board is responsible for the 
company strategy.  Some argued that the CEO runs the company and is directly involved 
in the business, and that without adopting his or her company strategy, one cannot have a 
committed or passionate leader. As a consequence, people are unlikely to invest in the 
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business. A company is unlikely to succeed if it is run by an administrator who is 
executing someone else’s ideas.  
 
Another issue raised was that of finding appropriate board members. The responsibility 
of sitting on a listed company board is very time consuming and onerous. The board 
member is as culpable as the directors and there is great risk if they do not keep up to 
date with the activities of the company. Being a valuable non-executive board member is 
a difficult task.  
 
According to the respondents, it again comes back to the individual. There are sufficient 
rules and regulations to ensure that people behave properly and, as stated previously, can 
draw from the expertise of non-executives, which is a shallow pool in the property 
industry. There are other synergistic and negative reasons, but provided the conflicts are 
managed, that expertise can be drawn upon.   
 
Conflict does not necessarily detract from benefiting a fund. A person’s resignation from 
one board because of a conflict can result in longer-term negatives for that vehicle. The 
erosion of certain synergies can then benefit a fund.  
 
The respondents felt that there are certain clear rules concerning good and bad 
governance. Strictly speaking, having a board member on a board of companies that is in 
competition with one another company is not good governance. However, some of these 
companies are among the best run property companies, and their shareholders are very 
pleased with them.  
 
All in all, the respondents felt that long-run, corporate governance is the defining issue of 
the 21st century. 
 
4.4 ASSET MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 
 
Do external management companies (Mancos) create a potential conflict of interest? 
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 “The mancos are being put first. A lot of companies do this and it is a flagrant 
violation of corporate governance.” 
 
          
Yes
No
Depends
        
 
 The majority of respondents felt that external Mancos create a definite potential for 
conflict of interest. 
 
The crux of business and the definition of an asset manager is the preservation or the 
growth in shareholders value and investment. Rather than protect the tenants, the 
directors or the shareholders, the asset manager should protect the shareholders who rely 
on them to get them the maximum investment to equal or better the average return they 
can expect in the current economic market environment.  
 
There are clearly influences on return such as interest rates, the stock market and the 
listed bond markets, that the asset managers have no control over in the macro-economic 
environment. The aspects that asset managers can control such as the level of rental 
returns, vacancies and bad debts can be managed to ensure that they are better than their 
competitors. Ensuring that investors are getting the best value for returns means 
sustainable returns that are not based on six-month or one-year horizons but on five-year 
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horizons.1  
 
It is a trend and a perception that the management in an internally managed company is 
more committed to the company and has a greater vested interest in it than the 
management in an externally managed one, where the company is just one of many.   
 
Respondents felt there is too much overlap between asset and property management. 
They should be kept separate as there is a conflict of interest between them.    
 
Conflicts occur when property and financial management is out-sourced and 
administration is done in- house. . With the asset managers being paid a fee on the market 
capitalisation, there is a risk that the asset manager bulks up the size of the company, and 
if he predicts incorrectly, devalues the share price thus the risk in asset management is 
that the fees earned in buying and selling properties can be driven by self-interest. 
 
Analyses of property income ratios on properties that have internal and external Mancos 
are regularly done. These show that there are various clear advantages and disadvantages 
to having external Mancos.  Most show that properties are more profitable with external 
managers. This is interesting as properties with external Mancos generally do not involve 
large sums of money and remunerations are generally fair. 
 
On the other hand, properties with internal Mancos generally have very high property 
income ratios and have a reluctant approach to managing their operational expenses. 
Several years ago when corporate governance was less prominent, there were situations 
where the salary of a non-executive chairman’s secretary or speeding fines were paid by 
the listed company. Some executives lived very lavishly on their expenditures, such as 
enjoying holidays in six-star game lodges.  
 
Respondents questioned why there are so many highly-paid executives in listed 
                                        
1 Five years appear to be a long time frame but in South Africa it is prudent that asset managers look at 
each five year period whereas in the UK they are looking at 10, 15 to 20 year horizons because they operate 
in different economic climates. 
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companies that have no external Mancos. They felt that a listed property can be run 
simply with a CEO, an accountant, a secretary and a few assistants.  
 
Respondents felt that having internal or external management structure was largely 
dictated by trends.   
 
Does the in-house management structure benefit the shareholder better than the 
out-sourced management structure? 
 
“South Africa has historically had situations where managers act for self enrichment, 
putting properties together, listing them and then, for instance, sailing to Australia for 
three months.” 
 
         
Yes
No
Depends
 
 
The respondents agreed that an in-house management structure benefits the shareholder 
but they had mixed responses regarding in-house verse out-sourced management 
structures. They agreed that there are some advantages to an internal management 
structure but that the way some of the listed property companies are currently conducting 
themselves is not stacking up favourably against those listed properties that have external 
management structures.  It is the lesser of two evils. 
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Analysts cannot pick up transparency and disclosure issues as they don’t have access to 
some of the details. It is only over several years that people hear about mismanagement 
within such companies. With an external Manco, it is easy to calculate the accuracy of 
fees on the last day of every month in comparison to what other companies are paying 
their executives. 
  
Respondents added that South Africa has historically had situations where managers act 
for self enrichment, putting properties together, listing them and then, for instance, sailing 
to Australia for three months.  
 
Respondents felt that listed property sector now has some credibility and that CEOs have 
better ethics and have their shareholders interests at heart. Five years ago, shareholders 
were mot invited to company presentations and taken on tours of properties. Today, 
CEOs are willing to educate their investors. By having their shareholders interests at 
heart, companies ultimately see their share prices grow and their cost of funding 
decrease. Asset managers recognise that they need to have their shareholders interests at 
heart to grow their business.  
 
4.5 PROMOTORS' FEES 
 
Does the current promoters' fees structure align the interest of both the shareholder 
and investor? 
 
“If there are promoters’ fees, then there is a tendency to churn.” 
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Yes
No
Depends
 
          
The majority of the respondents said that promoters' fees in general were not acceptable. 
 
It was generally felt that promoters grew the industry from what it was 10 years ago. 
While still not an enormous industry, they felt that it is at least being noticed, as seen by 
the coverage of analysts and asset. As little as five years ago, there were only two 
independent property analysts in South Africa.  Today, the picture is very different. 
Promoters have brought a new energy to the market, given investors something new to 
invest in and are forming new companies. Taking into account the risks they took, they 
have been fairly remunerated for their effort in the last few years, and their remuneration 
was fair. 
 
Many of the respondents felt that there should be no promoters’ fees as it is the 
promoters' job to look after the shareholders and their fee should come out of a better 
asset management fee. Most companies work on the basis that they receive a bonus from 
doing their job well. The bonus comes out of the asset management fee which reflects the 
promoters’ performance. 
 
Respondents felt that promoters’ fees create a tendency to churn. Straight asset 
management fees are acceptable if they add value. An examination of IPD results shows 
that companies that churn their results have better returns than those that don’t. Churning 
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is considered as positive, as long as it isn't done on the back of promoters’ fees.  If it is 
just the asset management fee which is a function of the share value, with churning to add 
value, then the share price should rise.  The asset management fee should rise, but not for 
promoters' fees. 
 
In some companies, directors deal on behalf of the company in the interests of the 
company, buying and selling assets, listing in funds and raising new capital. As  they 
don’t pay handling or consultancy fees, nor commissions, all the benefit contribute to the 
bottom line and go straight to the shareholders. These directors work for a salary and 
incentives based on performance, and all the benefits are for the shareholders.  
 
The general perception is that while promoter's fees are acceptable, how they are paid is 
not. Respondents feel that promoters are only interested in obtaining new investors, 
taking their profit and then withdrawing. Respondents argue that ideally, promoters' fees 
should be inequity or shares in the fund, that promoter should be locked in for a specific 
period and that the fee should be based on the performance of the fund.  
 
The respondents felt that promoters' fees should be based on whatever works best for the 
company as there is a common pricing in the market; if the pricing is broken down 
between the different funds, you get to a similar answer. For instance, a charge 0.5% of 
enterprise value and enterprise value being the market cap + the net, other companies 
might charge 0,25% but then they charge a transaction fee or a capital movement fee. 
Many companies charge the same amount as there are very small differences in the 
industry. 
 
4.6 DIRECTORS’ DEALINGS 
 
Should individuals be allowed to hold numerous directorships? 
 
 
“You cannot legislate on human behaviour as people are either inherently honest 
or dishonest.” 
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Yes
No
Depends
 
          
The majority of the respondents felt that due to the skills shortage in South Africa, 
directors should be able to sit on multiple boards. The issue that was raised was that a 
person’s behaviour stems from an individual’s integrity, how they conduct themselves on 
the numerous boards and how they manage the conflicts. 
 
If directors act responsibly and are accountable for their actions, King 2 would not be 
necessary. One can stipulate that these are the director’s responsibilities and what 
directors are accountable for. It is not necessary to legislate on human behaviour since 
how directors interpret a code of conduct is based on how they personally perceive 
honesty or dishonesty. 
 
Should comprehensive disclosure of direct and indirect transacting with directors be 
provided? 
 
“There should be comprehensive disclosure of any transactions however small or 
big.” 
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Yes
No
 
         
The majority of the respondents said that all transactions should be disclosed but there 
was an outlying view that it should not be enforced as the investors are not interested and 
that it is an onerous task. Enforcing disclosure can become exceptionally cumbersome. 
.  
Do incentive schemes align managerial behaviour with the interests of shareholders? 
 
“Those funds where management has a big stake in the funds definitely have a 
greater incentive to perform well.” 
 
         
Yes
No
Depends
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The majority of respondents agreed that incentive schemes would align managerial 
behaviour with that of the shareholders. 
 
There is a huge debate amongst listed companies whether incentive programmes or share 
options are more effective. Both options can work but have to be aligned in the interests 
of the company. Aligning short-term interests with longer term incentives can also lead to 
abuse, if the focus is to chase the incentive. Like any share scheme, there is a risk 
attached to it.  
 
It was felt that since all income received in the property industry is paid to shareholders; 
there is a closer relationship between income and price. However, this can creates 
problems, as happened several months ago when the industry in South Africa was 
knocked down by 25%. Such problems can occur in the short term when there is a 
disparity between price and income, but in the long-term, there is a very close 
relationship between the two.  
 
One school of thought is that management should be given shares, which puts them in 
exactly the same shoes as an investor. However, the down side to this approach is that 
share movements are not always related to management performance; they can also be 
simply due to the market.  Another approach is recognising that investing is a long-term 
process, and since managers are employees by definition, , they cannot be expected to go 
without income for several years in the hope that, in time, the share price will increase 
and they will then be rewarded.  
 
It is difficult to map the two concepts as incentive schemes are seen as remuneration. A 
manager or director is paid slightly less than would otherwise be the case and an 
incentive scheme makes up for the shortfall. If the incentive scheme only performs in 
four or five years, the individual has been underpaid for the first two years until that 
incentive provides value.  
 
Short-term incentives provide short-term results, not necessarily long-term ones. 
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However, markets have dictated that incentives don’t affect results. In a large company, it 
is virtually impossible for management to influence the share price. Respondents felt that 
all that would happen is that management would stay with the company; feeling happier 
because they were making more money.  
 
The respondents felt that incentive schemes should apply to managers, rather than 
directors, as managers are employed to do a job and are paid a fee to do it. There are 
intermittent share incentive schemes for fund managers which are linked to the share 
price of the fund. This price can fluctuate, irrespective of whether the manager is 
performing well or not. The fluctuations of interest rates cannot be legislated on. 
Essentially, respondents felt that incentive schemes are effective. When management has 
a large stake in the funds, it has a greater incentive to perform well. Internal boards 
managing the interests of the company receive a bonus from the net profit of the 
company.  
 
4.7 VALUATIONS 
 
Are valuers being pressurised into meeting management’s expectations? 
 
“The estimated amount for which a property should be exchanged on the date of 
valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller is an arm’s-length 
transaction after proper marketing, wherein the parties had each acted 
knowledgeably, prudently, and without compulsion.” 
 
       
Yes
No
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Valuation is a critically important issue that goes to the heart of good corporate 
governance and financial asset management. In the listed property sectors, it is widely 
recognized that a consistent approach to valuation is needed to ensure a credible South 
African Property Index. This is depicted in the data collection. Investors, now more than 
ever, are comparing property investments with competing asset classes such as cash, 
bonds and equities.  
 
In line with the JSE regulations, it is recommended that where properties are externally 
valued at least once every three years, the listed property sector should regularly instruct 
and consult with independent valuers. Adhering to this ensures ongoing unbiased and 
consistent reporting of valuations. In accordance with the International Valuation 
Standards Committee, the listed property sector should determine the market value of 
every property,  
 
Respondents stated that valuers have recently come under pressure, and there are 
instances where the cash flow rate exceeds the value. CEOs have then contacted 
independent valuers to question this. It should be noted that in reality, when a property is 
put on the market, quotes from three brokers can be 20, 30 or 40% more than the value 
being placed on it.  
 
In the past, institutions that conducted valuations for investments were not held 
accountable and were pressurized into giving false information. This caused many 
investors to burn their fingers, which caused a furore. The industry was eventually forced 
to deal more openly and governance was put into place to avoid future miscalculation. In 
the UK and US, valuators can be sued for over or devaluing assets.  
 
Today, property values are well audited and no one benefits from dramatically increasing 
the value of the investments to impress their shareholder and board of directors. Most 
funds prefer to have half the portfolio valued externally for transparency and compliance 
with corporate governance. Audits are done externally to give credibility to the investors 
that the company is not improving their results artificially.   
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Respondents felt that by creating transparency and giving cognizance to investors, the 
listed property sector is now an interesting investment. It is now a bond with a potential 
for growth. What analysts are looking for today is market growth, annual reports and long 
leases. They can now put a price to a portfolio, which is redefining the sector’s strategy 
on transparency. 
 
Today, everyone in the property industry believes that valuations over the past few years 
have been are too conservative, which explains the premium. The board works with the 
valuer in a valuation committee to discuss values, however, in the end; it is the valuer 
who makes the final valuation. The committee can only explain why it wants a property 
valued for a certain amount.  
 
Respondents stated that the issue again boils down to managers, and how they are 
checked upon. The property market generally increases by 8%, so if a property is re-
valued at 30%, the market does not take the market seriously.  
 
Another respondent’s view was that management should be allowed to value their own 
properties as valuer adds no value. “I don’t have to have valuers tell me what my assets 
are worth,” said one respondent. “The markets tell me what my assets are worth every 
single day”. 
 
A respondent stated that valuers value a property differently depending on the 
circumstances. A valuer will come up for a different figure for a property if it is owned 
by a company that has no gearing than if it is owned by a company that is heavily geared. 
This is associated with the greater risk of being sued by the company that is heavily 
geared.  
 
Respondents argued that valuations should be performed by external valuers and that new 
valuers should be selected every three years. This does not increase the cost in any way 
and ensures that expenditure is well spent.  
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Furthermore, the market has to go through the cycle. In a bull market it will be 
undervalued and in a bear market, over valued.  This is because in their valuations, 
valuers do not always adjust the inputs as often as the markets changes. For example, a 
valuer might use an older 20% risk pre rate, when in fact it has now dropped to 7%. To 
be useful, the valuations need to be market related.  
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has provided insight into the protection of shareholders interests in the listed 
property funds in South Africa. The conclusions linked to the evaluation and discussion 
of results and the testing of the three research propositions are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In this final chapter, the three broad propositions formulated at the start of the research 
are tested against the findings in Chapter 4. The chapter concludes with areas of further 
research.  
 
5.2 STRENGTH OF SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH PROPOSITION 1 
 
 
 The South African listed property sector governance mechanism is reflective of 
international standards. (International market) 
 
From the results presented in Chapter 4, it was clear that, broadly, the governance 
mechanisms in the South African listed property sector are  not reflective of international 
standards. This is due to a number of factors.  
 
International investors are more vigilant about corporate governance than local ones, 
especially after scandals such as Enron. However, it is unfair to say that the South 
African listed property sector is not reflective of international standards when, on paper, 
Enron was compliant.  
 
The literature defines corporate governance as a process that reveals the transformation 
that take place in power mechanisms. Corporate governance, as a whole, is part of a 
bundle of governance mechanisms that are still being finalized in South Africa. 
Internationally, the governance mechanisms are in place, yet certain forms of governance 
appear to be more successful than others. Locally and internationally, governance is the 
object of incessant compromise within an organization, which must always be renewed.  
 
The only factor that respondents felt were reflective of international standards was that of 
directors' dealings. The evaluation and discussion of results in Chapter 4 made it clear 
that human behaviour could not be legislated. The Enron scandal was a perfect example 
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of a company that adhered to all corporate governance regulations but where the ethics 
and integrity of the directors was totally lacking. This could happen anywhere in the 
world. While corporate governance is broadly defined as the body of principles and rules 
that guide and limit the actions of directors, it cannot stop a dishonest director from 
ignoring corporate governance rules.  
 
The findings also suggest that the board framework doesn't reflect international standards 
in that the international market has the breadth of skills to ensure that its framework is 
consistent with corporate governance best practice. 
 
The study suggests that the South African listed property sector's local structure, of both 
PUTs and the PLSs, is also not reflective of international standards. It is difficult for 
shareholders to have confidence in the local market because it is not transparent. 
However, the literature suggests that corporate governance in REITs is not necessarily 
any better.  
 
The study also concludes that the local valuation of the South African listed property 
sector does not reflect international standards. International standards are more advanced 
due to the industry following one standard.  
 
5.3 STRENGTH OF SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH PROPOSITION 2 
 
 
The South African listed property sector governance mechanisms protect 
shareholders interests. (Shareholders interests.) 
 
From the results presented in Chapter 4, it was made clear that, broadly, the governance 
mechanisms in the South African listed property sector do not protect shareholders 
interests.  
 
The literature states that corporate governance consists of a set of mechanisms designed 
to protect investors against expropriation by insiders and management. South African 
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listed sector governance mechanisms protect shareholders interests in certain areas. At 
the moment, the industry tries to adhere to the rules and regulations but most companies 
find it difficult to do.  
 
The findings also make clear that governance stands in contrast to management. The 
majority of respondents said that the corporate governance mechanisms where becoming 
extremely onerous and were hindering companies from focusing on their core business. 
Another outcome of the research was that all effective decision-making powers fall to 
those who have capital. However, corporate governance is justified for two reasons: 
 
•  There exists a permanent state of conflict between the various stakeholders 
and shareholders in the firm due to the decision of how wealth should be 
shared. 
•  It is impossible to predict every conflict that will arise. 
 
The board framework is important in ensuring that the governance mechanisms protect 
shareholders. The literature states that the board of directors is an important organisation 
mechanism in monitoring and disciplining the management’s activities. The number of 
outside directors on the board is an indication of the board’s independence.  The outside 
directors play an important role in resolving agency problems between management and 
shareholders. 
 
The local structure of the listed property sector of both the PUTs and the PLSs are made 
to adhere to certain governance mechanisms that protect shareholders. The current 
structure is not transparent which makes it difficult for the governance mechanisms to 
protect shareholders interests.  
 
Another issue that was raised in Chapter four was the incentive structures that could 
assist in aligning management with the shareholders. It is difficult for investors to force 
fund managers to pick a suitable managerial action. Investors can only set appropriate 
incentive structures that will condition the management’s utility to the observable 
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variables, and thus eliminate the moral hazard. Incentive contracts are a widely used 
strategy to control corporate governance problems. Incentive contracts aim to align 
managerial behaviour with the interests of shareholders through strengthening the link 
between managers’ interests and corporate performance.   
 
The areas where the South African listed property sector has potential governance 
problems in protecting shareholders’ interests are: 
 
•  Board independence and composition 
•  Managerial relationships between fund managers and the property manager 
•  Property managers are compensated on the gross income – not net income. 
 
5.4   STRENGTH OF SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH PROPOSITION 3 
 
The South African listed property sector governance mechanisms are reflective of 
local standards. (Local market.) 
 
The results presented in Chapter 4 suggest that on a broad level, the governance 
mechanisms in the South African listed property sector are reflective of local standards. 
This is due to a number of factors.  
 
Corporate governance mechanisms have improved dramatically in the listed sector. 
Existing legal remedies, such as the Companies Act, the JSE listing requirements, are 
forcing companies to comply. The King 2 Report on Corporate Governance, moved to a 
triple bottom line, which embraces the economic, environmental and social aspects of a 
company’s activities. The South African listed property sector governance mechanisms 
are partially reflective of local standards as they partly legal and mainly guidelines that 
companies can comply with if they choose. From the results presented in Chapter 4, it 
was clear that on a broad level, companies try to adhere to all the guidelines but 
sometimes fall short. The problems arise when South African companies comply with the 
minimum standards but make little headway in revealing the finer details of the more 
sensitive and important business issues. One of the key reasons for this is the lack of 
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shareholder activism in South Africa compared with other countries. 
 
The literature states that the separation of duties between the managing board of the 
senior management and the supervisory board representing the interests of the 
stakeholders in the company ensures a clear cut division in roles with respect to day-to-
day management and long run planning. But locally, this has come under a lot of 
criticism, as key supervisory board members are increasingly seen to be members of a 
number of such boards and are alleged to maintain only their own interests. However, it 
has been argued that this system, where banks have greater access to information, reduces 
transaction costs and increases efficiency.  
 
From the results presented in Chapter 4, it was clear that the South African listed property 
sector does not have the expertise to have different outside directors sitting on the boards. 
It was a noted that this situation was not adhering to governance standards but it was 
mentioned that the integrity of the individuals were able to manage the conflicts and that 
the shareholders interests were protected.  
 
The local structure of the listed property sector of both the PUTs and the PLS’s are under 
scrutiny from the local and international sector and discussions are underway to change 
the existing REITs structure. One of the reasons for this is to encourage outside 
investment as international investors do not understand South Africa’s existing structures. 
The question was raised whether a REIT structure would improve South African listed 
properties corporate governance. The literature states that poor management is not 
eliminated by adopting a REIT structure. Corporate governance in the REIT sector 
internationally has been a topical issue. The US REITs have had a stigma of having the 
worst corporate governance relative to other public companies.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Corporate governance can be regulated and legislated, but what validates and makes it a 
success is the integrity of individuals whose power it is to enforce it. Human behaviour 
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and values unfortunately can be. Corporate governance is more about the ethics of the 
management than regulatory bodies. For corporate governance to be more successful, 
shareholders need to be more active and exert more power. The board has a major part to 
play in governance as it has direct influence. The issue of directors having multiple 
directorships can only be rectified over time as the industry grows, with which will come 
a larger resource base of qualified experts. The main themes highlighted in the data are 
transparency and disclosure, which also, could improve corporate governance. 
 
5.6    AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The research presented in this report offers a broad view of the protection shareholders 
interests in listed property funds in South Africa. From this, a number of areas for future 
research have been identified. 
 
•  The valuation mechanisms of the listed property funds in South Africa. 
•  The protection of shareholders in the South African REITs structure.  
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ANNEXURES 
 
Appendix A: Draft Interview Protocol 
 
The proposed interviewee candidates, as listed in the table in Chapter 3, will be contacted 
and invited to participate in the research. If the candidates are willing to participate, the 
initial meeting will be set-up at the convenience of the interviewee. Once the research has 
been completed, the participant will be given a copy of the final document. 
 
Proposed key research questions 
 
Question 1: Does good corporate governance pay? 
(Global institutional investors pay a premium for shares of a well-governed company. Is 
this true of South African investors?) 
 
Question 2: Please give me an understanding of how the structure in your organization is 
set out, with regards to the board, the asset managers, the property managers and the fund 
managers.  
 
Question 3: Do you think external Manco’s create the potential conflicts of interest by 
obscuring the disclosure of management remuneration? 
 
Question 4: When it comes to securitisation, traditional models of capital structure are 
based on the premise that corporate managers always act in the interest of the owners and 
the primary aim of managers is to increase shareholders wealth. Is this true of South 
African listed property? 
 
Question 5: Do you think individuals should be allowed to hold numerous directorships? 
 
Question 6: Do you think that debt can be used as a disciplining device that constrains the 
amount of funds available for managerial opportunisms? 
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 Question 7: What ownership levels are given to the management shareholding as the 
percentage of shares owned and controlled by the office and directors of the company? 
 
Question 8: Are the shareholders able to influence the way the industry is governed and 
assist with ensuring the equilibrium of power is equal between shareholders and 
managers? 
 
Question 9: Do you think the current promoters’ fees payment structure aligns the 
interests of both the promoter and the investor? 
 
Question 10: How can managers assure outside investors that their interests are being 
looked after and that they will be receiving a fair return on their investment? 
 
Question 11: Do you think that governance in South Africa is adhered to and that it deals 
with conflicts of interest adequately? 
 
Question 12: Do you think comprehensive disclosure of both direct and indirect 
transacting with directors should be provided regardless of transaction size? 
 
Question 13: Are valuer’s being pressurized into meeting management’s expectations? 
 
Question 14: Do asset management fees create an outright conflict of interest by tempting 
management to “churn” a portfolio for their benefit instead of the fund? 
 
Question 15: Do you find rental collection, board composition and independency, the 
relationship between fund managers and property managers and property management 
compensation to be areas of potential conflict? 
 
Question 16: Do you think incentive scheme contracts will help align managerial 
behaviour with the interests of shareholders by linking managerial decisions with 
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corporate performance? 
 
Question 17: The two-tiered board system, devised as a corporate governance 
mechanism, was aborted due to board members sitting on multiple boards of the same 
industry. Is this not true of South African listed property boards? 
 
Question 18: Is it acceptable for directors and mancos to share in brokers’ commissions? 
 
Question 19: King 2 relies heavily on disclosure. Do companies disclose all information? 
 
Question 20: Do board members enforce effective measures to achieve compliance and 
corporate governance in SA? 
 
Question 21: Do you think that the in-house management structure should benefit the 
shareholder better than the out-sourced structure? 
 
Question 22: Do you think good governance adds value to the shareholder? 
 
Question 23: Does the existing PLS and PUT structure, which allows for external 
management companies, obscure transparency? 
 
Question 24: Non-executive directors are often shareholders or representatives of 
mancos.. Are the interests of the property company or those of the manco being put first? 
 
Question 25: Can shareholders be assured that decision-making regarding the payment of 
management fees is being made in their best interests? 
 
Question 26: Where directors of the fund are also directors of the property management 
company, do they objectively assess performance and what role do they play in the 
negotiations of the property management fee? 
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Question 27: Are companies making independent decisions with regard to funding when 
executive directors of banking institutions are on the board? 
 
Question 28: Where are promoters' fees deemed acceptable? 
 
Question 29: Where do you think the future lies for the SA listed funds? Do you think 
that South Africa will follow the REIT structure? 
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